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Publicity: A Path to Regaining Autonomy 
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ABSTRACT 
This Note explores how a right of publicity action might be used to address present-
day concerns regarding biometric data ownership rights where an individual’s 
likeness can essentially be bought and sold. As social networking and use of the 
internet has grown, so has the opportunity for people to engage with others and share 
their lives. However, that opportunity also comes with risk. More and more, people 
are required to accept the terms of use and privacy policies detailing how their 
biometric data will be collected and stored if they want to download and use certain 
technological applications. Most of these applications are offered to the public free 
of charge, so how is it these companies continue to increase their revenue? This Note 
purports that the users’ biometric data stands as a bargaining chip that is shared with 
tech companies in exchange for use of their product. After the companies collect this 
biometric data, it is sold for profit. By this very act it is proven that a person’s 
likeness has commercial value— and should not be misappropriated for another’s 
benefit. At the time of this Note, a few U.S. states have enacted biometric data 
regulations, but in the majority of states, consumers remain vulnerable. This is where 
the common law right of publicity comes in, as a potential vehicle to help everyday 
citizens regain control over their likeness, or at minimum, receive compensation 
where it is misused. Biometric data regulation is in its nascent stage and the extent of 
damage resulting from the individual’s loss of control over their biometric data is as 
yet unknown, but this Note endeavors to work out a possible avenue to regain control 
over commodified identity. 
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Roses are red 
Violets are blue 
When the product is free 
The product is you.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s modern world, individuals are essentially compelled to 
engage with social media and smart technology in order to maintain 
their social circles, professional presence, or even romantic 
relationships.2 This is not to say that online engagement is necessarily 
a burden. Arguably, technological advancements have made lives 
easier and more secure.3 Yet, ironically, these same advancements can 
bring serious risks regarding the security of sensitive biometric data.4 
 
1 Matt Cagle (@Matt_Cagle), TWITTER (Feb. 14, 2019, 11:47 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Matt_Cagle/status/1096269666412986373 [https://perma.cc/
HLU6-HXFJ]. 
2 See Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era 
of Privacy Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-
in-an-era-of-privacy-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/GAA4-6VCM] (survey 
showing Americans’ conflicting feelings about the essential nature of an internet 
presence versus privacy concerns); New Poll: Americans Overwhelmingly 
Support Existing Net Neutrality Rules, Affordable Access, and Competition 
Among ISPs, FREEDMAN CONSULTING, LLC 1–2 (July 10, 2017), 
https://tfreedmanconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Tech-Policy-Poll-
Summary-Final_20170710.pdf [https://perma.cc/N493-PXWC] (2017 poll 
showing that a broad majority of Americans believe the internet is essential to 
their everyday lives). 
3 For example, the use of facial recognition or fingerprint recognition software to 
authenticate identity for security purposes. See Kristine Hamann and Rachel 




4 See Slobodan Ribarić & Nikola Pavešić, De-identification for Privacy 
Protection in Biometrics, in USER-CENTRIC PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN 
BIOMETRICS 293, 295 (Claus Vielhauer ed., 2017) (“There are two different 
approaches to the relation between privacy and biometrics technology. The first 
approach is based on the assumption that biometrics protects privacy and 
information integrity by restricting access to personal information. The second 
approach is based on the belief that biometrics technology introduces new 
privacy threats . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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Biometric data generally refers to the unique physiological or 
behavioral characteristics that both identify and distinguish us from all 
other persons, e.g. fingerprints or facial scan.5 
Many individuals, either willingly or unwittingly, have exchanged 
their highly valuable data for the ability to use the services of 
companies like tech giants Google and Facebook. While there has 
been a nationwide push to strengthen data privacy laws to include 
biometric data,6 specific protections to address ongoing ownership of 
identity are largely absent. As it stands, once a person consents to 
share their biometric data, they may be powerless to restore exclusive 
ownership.7 However, there are data protection models, both in Europe 
and most recently in the state of California, that may adequately 
address these autonomy concerns.8 
Part II of this Note discusses the timely and controversial topic of 
biometric data, the reason for its value, and which entities use it. Part 
III describes the disparate state privacy laws relating to the use of 
biometric data—most prominent in Illinois, Texas, and Washington. 
Part IV will briefly look to the historic roots of the right of publicity 
and its progenitor, the right of privacy,9 and end with the present-day 
hodge-podge collection of right of publicity statutes littered across the 
U.S. This sets the stage to theorize how a reimagined right of 
publicity, coupled with the dignitary right of privacy, might address 
 
5 Id. at 294. 
6 See, e.g., H.R. 72, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017); H.R. 350, 149th Gen. 
Assemb. (Del. 2018); S. 120, 191st Sess. (Mass. 2019); H.R. 5019, 99th Leg. 
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017); S. 1203, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). It should be noted 
that some states, while not always adopting a separate statute dedicated to 
biometric privacy, have “expanded how they define ‘personal information’ 
under their state data breach notification laws to include biometric 
information . . . .” Chris Brook, Biometric Privacy Legislation Catching on 
Across America, DIGITAL GUARDIAN: DATA INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/biometric-privacy-legislation-catching-across-
america [https://perma.cc/H5MY-C7GN]. 
7 See Alan S. Wernick, Biometric Information – Permanent Personally 
Identifiable Information Risk, A.B.A. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/2019/201902/f
a_8/ [https://perma.cc/UAZ8-3XYY]. 
8 Biometrics: definition, trends, use cases, laws and latest news, THALES (Sept. 
10, 2020) https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-
security/government/inspired/biometrics [https://perma.cc/T24H-ABC3] 
[hereinafter Biometrics Review]. 
9 Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 
U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 234 (2005). 
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current biometric data concerns. Part V first turns the focus overseas to 
Europe and then westward to California to examine how other data 
privacy regulations might help reinstate autonomy over biometric data. 
The conclusion in Part VI reviews the current U.S. and European data 
regulation landscapes and asserts that whether those regulations 
succeed or fail, a re-imagined right of publicity can serve as a 
secondary protection over our newly commodified identity. 
II. BIOMETRIC DATA – WHAT IS IT WORTH AND TO WHOM DOES IT 
HAVE WORTH? 
Biometric data is often divided into two categories: physiological 
and behavioral.10 Physiological biometrics are the more permanent, 
unique, physical attributes of a person that typically remain unaffected 
by outside stress and time, such as fingerprints, the shape of the face or 
hand, and iris scans.11 Behavioral biometrics typically include “voice 
recognition, signature dynamics (speed of movement of pen, 
accelerations, pressure exerted, inclination), keystroke dynamics, the 
way we use objects, gait, the sound of steps, gestures, etc.”12 
A. The Marketability of Biometric Data and User Concerns 
Because biometric data provides a quick and reliable method of 
identifying individuals or authenticating their identity,13 the value of 
the “biometric system market” has skyrocketed and is projected to 
almost double in size “from USD 33.0 billion in 2019 to USD 65.3 
billion by 2024.”14 The gargantuan size of the biometric system market 
yields strong implications for both users and companies,15 and not 
always for the better.16 In 2018, the University of Texas at Austin’s 
Center for Identity conducted a survey detailing consumer attitudes 
 




14 Biometric System Market - Global Forecast to 2024, MKTS. AND MKTS. (Oct. 
2019), https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/next-generation-
biometric-technologies-market-697.html [https://perma.cc/SH9T-5XA7]. 
15 See Biometrics Review, supra note 8. 
16 New Survey on Biometric Technology Shows Consumers Are OK with Some 
Forms and Wary of Others, UT NEWS: CAMPUS & COMMUNITY (May 3, 2018), 
https://news.utexas.edu/2018/05/03/new-survey-on-consumer-attitudes-toward-
biometric-technology/ [https://perma.cc/H7PX-2SHT]. 
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toward biometrics and their comfort level with its various uses.17 The 
survey showed that “58 percent of those surveyed [said] they [felt] 
very comfortable with fingerprint scanning biometrics. Only about a 
third reported feeling very comfortable with any other biometric type. 
Survey respondents were most unsure about facial recognition 
technology, with 13 percent feeling ‘not at all comfortable’ . . . .”18 
This discomfort likely results from the absence of an overarching 
standard across the U.S. to regulate how companies store and collect 
the data, and the lack of concrete protection against its unauthorized 
use.19 Additionally, “people struggle to understand the nature and 
scope of the data collected about them. Just 9% believe they have ’a 
lot of control’ over the information that is collected[.]”20 Transparency 
as to what data is collected, who collects the data, and for what 
purpose is sorely lacking. 
B. Efforts of Companies to Self-Regulate due to Consumer 
Concerns 
In the absence of an expansive biometric data privacy right, some 
companies have made efforts to self-regulate and appear more 
transparent with their privacy policies;21 however, this effort leaves 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id.; see also Rachel L. German & K. Suzanne Barber, Consumer Attitudes About 
Biometric Authentication, U. TEX. AUSTIN: CTR. FOR IDENTITY 15 (May 2018), 
https://identity.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/2020-
09/Consumer%20Attitudes%20About%20Biometrics.pdf [https://perma.cc/E22
Y-PVPP] (This is the survey referenced within the article supra note 16.). 
19 Carra Pope, Note, Biometric Data Collection in an Unprotected World: 
Exploring the Need for Federal Legislation Protecting Biometric Data, 26 J.L. 
& POL’Y 769, 783–84 (2018). 
20 Rainie, supra note 2. 
21 See Apple Platform Security: Introduction to Apple Platform Security, APPLE, 
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/introduction-seccd5016d31/web 
[https:// perma.cc/AB7Q-Z6PL]. Surprisingly, Apple’s use of biometric 
identifiers in the authentication services used by its products do not bring the 
same associated risks that one would expect when one needs to scan their face 
almost 20 times per day. The simple reason being that Apple never shares your 
facial mapping template with any third party because the data is strictly housed 
within the tangible phone on a secure server. Apple Platform Security: Facial 
Matching, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/guide/security/facial-matching-
sece151358d1/web [https://perma.cc/B2JW-QWTX]. Even when Apple allows 
you to use Face ID to access or authenticate your identity in third-party apps, the 
third-party app never has access to your Face ID, rather “the app is notified only 
as to whether the authentication was successful; it can’t access Touch ID, Face 
ID, or the data associated with the enrolled user.” Apple Platform Security: 
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much to be desired.22 Google, for instance, has its privacy policy set 
across multiple pages that requires constant clicks and scrolls.23 
Though the privacy policies on Google’s web page are not written in 
complex legalese or unbearably small font, the language is ambiguous 
and often leaves out explanations of certain policies requiring yet 
another click to access them.24 Add a Google Nest system to the user’s 
household and there is a separate series of privacy and data policy 
 
Other Uses for Touch ID and Face ID, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/guide/s
ecurity/other-uses-for-touch-id-and-face-id-sec50f82ec35/1/web/1 
[https://perma.cc/4PZT-6HQS]. 
22 Romain Dillet, French Data Protection Watchdog Fines Google $57 Million 




24 See Our Commitment to Privacy in the Home, GOOGLE, 
https://store.google.com/category/google_nest_privacy [https://perma.cc/7UAT-
6CHF?type=image] (“We’ll also more clearly explain what types of information 
these sensors send to Google, as well as examples of how we use that 
information, to help you better understand their purpose.”). 
 
 Additionally, see an excerpt from Google’s Nest Privacy Policy: 
In addition to the data described in the Privacy Policy, when you 
use our connected home devices and services, we save: . . . Audio 
and video data from devices with cameras and microphones, and 
information derived from this data, such as facial recognition 
information (if you’ve set up this feature), and person, object, 
sound, motion or activity detection information, all subject to your 
permissions and settings. For example, we store your video footage 
if you choose to receive video storage services from Google for 
your Nest Cams. 
 
     . . . . 
 
Device usage data is also collected when a device is used with a 
Google service . . . such as voice or touch interactions, long presses 
on the device, or other device interactions or adjustments, 
including related device state, settings, and features used. 
 FAQs on Privacy: Google Nest, GOOGLE NEST, https://support.google.com/goog
lenest/answer/9415830?co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid&hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/2CJ6-CPQR] (select the first option entitled “What types of 
data are collected when I use Google Nest’s connected home devices and 
services?” under the heading “Information Google collects”). 
2021 Biometric Data Regulation 205 
pages to click through.25 Eventually, the site states that Google Nest 
and Google Home (in accordance with user preferences) can collect 
and store video, audio, and behavioral biometric data.26 However, 
Google does provide an opt-out option and an option to delete the 
recordings manually—though this process involves additional 
clicking, scrolling, and searching.27 
Conversely, Smule, an American mobile app developer with a 
popular singing app of the same name, is relatively transparent about 
the data it can collect within its Privacy Policy: 
To be clear, we don’t ask you to provide us with any sensitive 
personal information, such as information relating to your race or 
ethnic origin . . . [or your] genetic or biometric information . . . . 
However, if you decide to share this kind of information on Smule 
Services, you explicitly consent to us displaying it or sharing it in 
accordance with your selection.
28
 
While it is true that Smule does not explicitly ask users to provide 
them with biometric data, in the form of uploaded video and audio 
content, it does compel users to consent to Smule sharing that data 
once it is uploaded.29 Otherwise, Smule instructs users to leave the site 
immediately: “[i]f you do not agree to this Agreement or to the use of 
your personal information in accordance with our Privacy Policy, do 
not click on one of the ‘Account Creation Options’ . . . and do not 
access or otherwise use any portion of the Service.”30 
C. Use of Biometric Data in Security and the Non-Commercial 
Realm 
It is worthwhile to note how companies and public bodies utilize 
biometric data. Individuals, companies, and governments alike use 
 





28 Privacy Policy, SMULE, https://www.smule.com/en/privacy 
[https://perma.cc/BF7J-3C65]. The terms and conditions also allow revocation 
of consent and deletion of account, albeit with stipulations that Smule has 
discretion over when it is deleted. Id. 
29 Smule Terms of Service, SMULE, https://www.smule.com/en/termsofservice 
[https://perma.cc/792D-K8FK]. 
30 Id. 
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biometric software for non-commercial and security purposes.31 For 
example, retail business owners use facial recognition technology to 
identify shoplifters32 and daycare centers have long employed the use 
of fingerprint scanners to ensure only registered parents access the 
center.33 Recently, a non-commercial biometric identifier software, 
FakeApp AI, garnered some attention when viral videos demonstrated 
that any person with access to the software could make a video and, 
through the use of photoshop and facial-mapping technology, don the 
face of a famous person to fool the audience into believing it was the 
celebrity depicted.34 Additionally, law enforcement agencies in the 
U.S. have been collecting biometric data from citizens since the 
implementation of fingerprinting and in this aspect there is no 
substantive commercial use employed.35 The purpose behind biometric 
data collection by the Federal Bureau of Investigation was, and is, to 
use the data to correctly identify suspects (e.g. through fingerprint 
 
31 Clare Garvie, Facial Recognition Is Here. The iPhone X is Just the Beginning, 




33 See T’ash Spenser, Daycare Centers Using Biometrics to Protect Kids, 
BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (July 26, 2012), https://www.biometricupdate.com/201
207/daycare-centers-using-biometrics-to-protect-kids [https://perma.cc/75NX-
5HXY]. 
34 See David Singer & Camila Connolly, How Hollywood Can (and Can’t) Fight 
Back Against Deepfake Videos, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 7, 2019, 9:59 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/how-hollywood-can-can-t-fight-
back-deepfake-videos-guest-column-1237685 [https://perma.cc/ZHB9-6N3N]; 
Brian Higgins, At the Intersection of AI, Face Swapping, Deep Fakes, Right of 
Publicity, and Litigation, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECH. & L. (June 17, 2018), 
http://aitechnologylaw.com/2018/06/at-the-intersection-of-ai-face-swapping-
deep-fakes-right-of-publicity-and-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/X4MQ-9JLD]. In 
April 2018, a “deepfake” video featured comedian Jordan Peele using the AI 
software, donning the face of Former President Barack Obama, to deliver a 
public service announcement to people about the use of the software and 
possible subsequent fake news affect it would have, especially come election 
time. James Vincent, Watch Jordan Peele Use AI to Make Barack Obama 
Deliver a PSA About Fake News, VERGE (Apr. 17, 2018, 1:14 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2018/4/17/17247334/ai-fake-news-video-barack-
obama-jordan-peele-buzzfeed [https://perma.cc/52RC-SYJ7]. 
35 See Fingerprints and Other Biometrics, FBI, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics 
[https://perma.cc/84FL-QRL9]. 
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detection) to further the Bureau’s security goals.36 However, in early 
2019 the use of facial recognition software was banned in the city of 
San Francisco as an anti-surveillance ordinance measure.37 Although 
law enforcement has traditionally supported using new software to 
address safety concerns, their interests were no match for the outcry 
against facial recognition and its civil rights implications, citing the 
technology for its bias and poor track record of misidentifying people 
of color.38 
III.  CURRENT DISPARATE STATE BIOMETRIC PRIVACY STATUTES 
Multiple states have legislation pending before their respective 
legislatures that focus on providing protection for user control over 
biometric data.39 This section, however, will focus primarily on states 
whose biometric privacy laws are already in full effect: Illinois,40 
Texas,41 and Washington.42 These states have not simply broadened 
 
36 Id. 
37 See Rachel Metz, San Francisco Just Banned Facial-Recognition Technology, 
CNN: BUSINESS (May 14, 2019, 7:15 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/14/t
ech/san-francisco-facial-recognition-ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/H4FH-
J5WB]. 
38 Id. Recently, Amazon’s “Rekognition” software came under fire from its 
investors who did not think it was wise to aggressively market the surveillance 
software to law enforcement because it implicated civil rights issues. 
Shareholders have introduced two proposals on facial recognition 
for a vote. One asks the company to prohibit sales of its facial 
recognition system, called Amazon Rekognition, to government 
agencies, unless its board concludes that the technology does not 
facilitate human rights violations. The other asks the company to 
commission an independent report examining the extent to which 
Rekognition may threaten civil, human and privacy rights, and the 
company’s finances. 
 Natasha Singer, Amazon Faces Investor Pressure Over Facial Recognition, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2019, at B1. 
39 See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
40 Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1–99 
(2020). 
41 Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier (“CUBI”), TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 503.001 (West 2019). 
42 Biometric Identifiers (“BI”), WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010–.040 (2020). See 
also Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), 
THALES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-
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their data security breach laws to include biometric data, but have 
passed statutes designed specifically for the regulation of biometric 
data.43 Although all three statutes regulate the collection, use, and 
security of biometric data, they differ in certain regards. Key 
differences to note are (1) the types of biometric data the statute 
protects and what it excludes; (2) the prohibited and/or allowable 
purpose or use of an individual’s biometric data; and (3) who may 
bring suit. 
A.  First of Its Kind: The Illinois BIPA 
The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) was the 
first state biometric privacy statute, entering the scene in 2008.44 The 
statute protects biometric information such as: “a retina or iris scan, 
fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”45 The 
statute excludes, inter alia, “writing samples, written signatures, 
photographs, . . . tattoo descriptions” and “physical descriptions such 
as height [or] weight,” from protection; nor does it “include 
information derived from” these excluded identifiers.46 
While the BIPA does not apply to government entities, it does 
apply to private businesses or corporations, allowing them to “collect, 
capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a 
person’s” biometric identifier once they have informed the individual 
in writing that: (1) the individual’s “information is being collected or 
stored”; (2) “the specific purpose and length of term” for which the 
individual’s information is being used; and (3) the entity must also 
obtain a written release signed by the individual.47 A person in 
possession of another’s biometric information is prohibited from 
selling, disclosing, redisclosing, or otherwise disseminating “a 




43 Hannah Zimmerman, The Data of You: Regulating Private Industry’s Collection 
of Biometric Information, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 637, 648 (2018); see also Molly 
K. McGinley et al., The Biometric Bandwagon Rolls On: Biometric Legislation 
Proposed Across the United States, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www
.natlawreview.com/article/biometric-bandwagon-rolls-biometric-legislation-
proposed-across-united-states [https://perma.cc/ZUG3-ZBKN]. 
44 BIPA, 740 14/1–99. 
45 Id. at 14/10. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 14/15(b). 
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consents to the disclosure.48 The private entity is required to “store, 
transmit, and protect” all biometric data from disclosure with a 
reasonable standard of care typical of their industry and in the same 
fashion they would secure “other confidential and sensitive 
information.”49 A cause of action under BIPA can be pursued by 
“[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act.”50 The aggrieved is 
entitled to recover damages ranging from approximately $1,000 to 
$5,000, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.51 
Since the statute’s inception in 2008, there has been substantial 
development of BIPA case law, perhaps because the statute allows 
citizens to file complaints on their own. There are two cases worth 
noting: Patel v. Facebook, Inc.52 and Rosenbach v. Six Flags 
Entertainment Corp.53 
1. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.: What it 
Means to Be “Aggrieved” 
In Rosenbach, the plaintiff, a minor teen, picked up a Six Flags 
season pass that his mother had purchased for him online.54 When he 
collected his pass he was instructed to provide his “thumbprint” in 
accordance with the amusement parks’ procedures for season pass-
holders.55 After scanning his thumb and returning home, he informed 
his mother of the fingerprinting.56 Ms. Rosenbach was never informed 
that the park would collect her minor son’s biometric data; she was not 
provided information about how the data was stored, for what purpose, 
and for how long; nor had she given express consent to the collection 
of her son’s data.57 The Illinois Appellate Court found in favor of the 
 
48 Id. at 14/15(d)(1). This sentence only describes one exclusion, but there are 
three other exclusions to when a private entity may be permitted to disclose an 
individual’s biometric identifiers, for example, if the disclosure completes a 
financial transaction requested or authorized by the individual; when compelled 
by state or federal law or municipal ordinance; or the disclosure is made 
pursuant to a valid warrant or subpoena. Id. at 14/15(d)(2)-(4). 
49 Id. at 14/15(e)(1)-(2). 
50 Id. at 14/20. 
51 Id. at 14/20(1)-(4). 
52 Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019). 
53 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 Ill 123186. 
54 Id. at ⁋ 5. 
55 Id. at ⁋ 6. 
56 Id. at ⁋ 7–8. 
57 Id. at ⁋ 8. 
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defendant theme park who argued that in order to receive a remedy 
under the statute, the plaintiff must have plead some actual injury or 
harm “beyond infringement of the rights afforded them under the 
law.”58 However, the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with this 
finding, particularly because of the unambiguous language in the 
statute,59 which included a detailed statement of legislative intent.60 
The court reasoned, “[w]hen the statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, we may not depart from the law’s terms by reading into 
it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not 
express . . . .”61 Aggrieved is commonly defined as “suffering from an 
infringement or denial of legal rights.”62 Thus, a more stringent 
requirement of actual harm or adverse effect would be inconsistent 
with the straightforward legislative intent in protecting a person’s right 
of privacy.63 
2. Patel v. Facebook, Inc: The Latest Victory for BIPA 
In Patel, the class action plaintiffs brought suit against the tech 
giant, Facebook, for BIPA violations.64 Facebook had—through its 
Tag Suggestions feature—scanned and collected the face templates of 
users via its facial recognition software and stored the biometric data 
on its servers.65 Facebook did not inform the plaintiffs of the 
collection, obtain their written consent, or maintain a retention 
schedule as required by the statute. 66 
The court in Patel, held that plaintiffs had sufficient Article III 
standing under BIPA because the “statutory provisions at issue were 
established to protect [the plaintiffs’] concrete interests,” namely their 
privacy.67 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the right of privacy was 
“traditionally . . . regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit . . . .”68 
 
58 Id. at ⁋ 38. 
59 Id. 
60 BIPA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(a)-(g) (2020). 
61 Rosenbach, 2019 Ill 123186 ⁋ 24. 
62 Id. at ⁋ 32 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 25 (11th 
ed. 2006)). 
63 Id. at ⁋ 37. 
64 Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1274. 
67 Id. at 1271. 
68 Id. at 1273 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). 
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Furthermore, when bolstered by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
citing that privacy concerns are amplified by technological 
advancements in monitoring systems, the court concluded “that an 
invasion of an individual’s biometric privacy rights ‘has a close 
relationship to a harm’” giving rise to a lawsuit.69 Additionally, the 
court found “concrete and particularized harm” where violations of the 
procedures in BIPA can actually harm or pose a material risk of harm 
to substantive privacy interests. 70 
B. One Year Later, Here Comes Texas: CUBI 
In 2009, “Texas became the second state to pass a law protecting 
citizens’ biometric data.”71 The Texas Capture or Use of Biometric 
Identifier statute (“CUBI”), while relatively similar to BIPA, has key 
differences. CUBI protects biometric identifiers, such as “retina or iris 
scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry[,]” 
and does not name any exclusions.72 CUBI allows for the collection of 
biometric data of an individual for a commercial purpose, provided the 
person receives notice of this purpose and consents to its use (though a 
writing is not required).73 Although CUBI prohibits a person who 
possesses the biometric information of another to engage in a third-
party transfer, there are certain enumerated exceptions to this 
prohibition.74 Perhaps the biggest difference between the Texas CUBI 
statute and the Illinois BIPA statute is that CUBI does not allow for a 
private right of action; it is only actionable via the state’s Attorney 
 
69 Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). 
70 Id. at 1275. 
71 Pope, supra note 19, at 791. 
72 CUBI, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(a) (West 2019). 
73 Id. § 503.001(b). 
74 The exceptions are as follows: 
A person who possesses a biometric identifier of an individual that 
is captured for a commercial purpose: (1) may not sell, lease, or 
otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to another person 
unless: (A) the individual consents to the disclosure for 
identification purposes in the event of the individual’s 
disappearance or death; (B) the disclosure completes a financial 
transaction that the individual requested or authorized; (C) the 
disclosure is required or permitted by a federal statute or by a state 
statute . . . (D) the disclosure is made by or to a law enforcement 
agency for a law enforcement purpose in response to a 
warrant . . . . 
 Id. § 503.001(c)(1)(A)-(D). 
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General, who can pursue up to $25,000 per violation.75 Additionally, 
CUBI requires biometric data be destroyed within one year of its 
collection,76 whereas BIPA provides a longer, three-year window.77 To 
date, there are no published actions under CUBI. 
C. Washington Makes Three: Biometric Identifiers 
Last, but not least, Washington passed its own biometric data 
privacy statute (“BI”), which went into effect in July of 2017. In 
similar fashion to Illinois, Washington included a statement of 
legislative intent at the forefront of its statute. The “finding of intent” 
section reads: “[t]he legislature finds that citizens of Washington are 
increasingly asked to disclose sensitive biological information that 
uniquely identifies them for commerce, security, and convenience. The 
collection and marketing of biometric information . . . is of increasing 
concern.” 78 Through this section the legislature makes clear its intent 
to require businesses to first obtain the consent of users prior to 
“enrolling” their identity into any database, provide notice of this 
enrollment, and disclose how the biometric data collected will be 
used.79 
Like CUBI, Washington’s statute is only actionable by the 
Attorney General.80 Additionally, it has a broader definition of what is 
considered protected biometric data, but provides for exclusions to this 
definition such as “physical or digital photograph, video or audio 
recording or data generated therefrom[.]”81 The most notable 
difference distinguishing the Washington statute from Illinois and 
Texas is the broad exclusion of liability for entities that enroll and 
collect biometrics “in furtherance of a security purpose.”82 “‘Security 
purpose’ means the purpose of preventing shoplifting, fraud, or any 
other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value, including tangible 
and intangible goods, services, and other purposes in furtherance of 
protecting the security or integrity of software, accounts, applications, 
 
75 Id. § 503.001(d). 
76 Id. § 503.001(c)(3). 
77 BIPA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a). 
78 BI, WASH. REV. CODE. § 19.375.900 (2020). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. § 19.375.030(2). 
81 Id. § 19.375.010(1). 
82 Id. § 19.375.020(7). 
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online services, or any person.”83 Similar to Texas, there are no 
published actions under this Washington Biometric Identifiers statute 
as of the date of this Note. 
IV. THE REUNIFICATION OF PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY: BRINGING 
DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY BACK TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
A person’s biometric data—their identity—is personal and 
extremely sensitive, yet also a commodity and ultimately assignable to 
others via consent or contract under current law.84 Although there are 
state privacy laws in place that specifically govern the use of a 
person’s biometric data, these laws are relatively new and vary greatly 
in how, and when, a person can bring a cause of action predicated on 
the misuse of their data.85 To address this issue, it should be 
considered how the right of publicity, harmonized again with the right 
of privacy, could operate as a solution where a state is silent on 
biometric data regulation. This common law tort can be used to 
evaluate a cause of action under the right of publicity resulting from 
the misappropriation of biometric data, or identity. 
A. A Brief History of Misappropriation and its Alter Ego: The 
Right of Publicity 
In the early 1900s, the right of an individual to defend against the 
unwanted use of their name or likeness existed under an established 
right of privacy.86 It was not until the 1953 decision of Haelan 
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum that the term “right of publicity” 
was first coined, although the idea was not new.87 Indeed, by the time 
Haelan was decided it was widely recognized that a person had a 
property right in their name and likeness, and some states even had 
privacy laws specifically including misappropriation language.88 
Jennifer Rothman, author of The Right of Publicity explains, “[f]rom 
 
83 Id. § 19.375.010(8). 
84 See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 
190 (2012); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. 
g (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“The interest in the commercial value of a person’s 
identity is in the nature of a property right and is freely assignable to others.”). 
85 See supra Part III. 
86 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80–81(Ga. 1905). 
87 Haelen Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953). 
88 Id. 
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the start there was a property-based conception of the right of privacy. 
It was understood as a right of self-ownership.”89 This autonomous 
right was generally considered “personal and not assignable,”90 and 
private or public figures could pursue claims of misappropriation 
which inflicted emotional, economic, or reputational injury.91 Even 
though the right of publicity was not a novel idea, the expansion of 
publicity rights into a quasi-intellectual property right92 was a new 
concept, to which the Haelan court gave credence by allowing the 
transferability of publicity rights.93 
In his Right of Privacy article, Judge Richard Posner discussed the 
right of publicity and its importance as a vendible property right.94 He 
argued that there are “good economic reasons for assigning the 
property right in a photograph used for advertising purposes to the 
photographed individual: this assignment assures that the advertiser to 
whom the photograph is most valuable will purchase it. 
[Alternatively,] [m]aking the photograph the communal property of 
advertisers would not achieve this goal.”95 While Judge Posner’s 
approach hints at prioritizing the protection of an individual’s 
 
89 JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A 
PUBLIC WORLD 48 (2018). 
90 Id. at 47. “The Fifth Circuit in Hanna Manufacturing v. Hillerich & Bradsby 
held that a company could not divest a person of his name even if that company 
had an exclusive right to its use.” Id. at 48. “The court concluded that [even 
though persons had property rights in their names] this property was not 
‘vendible in gross’ so as to pass from purchaser to purchaser unconnected with 
any trade or business.” Id. at 48–49. See also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 408 (1960); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 209 (1954). But see Haelen Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d 
at 868 (re-interpreting publicity rights to be licensable and assignable). 
91 See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 30, 32–33. 
92 Separate from publicity rights, which are individuals’ rights against the 
misappropriation or misuse of their likeness and name for another’s benefit 
(resulting in a harm), are intellectual property rights, “[a] category of intangible 
rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect. The 
category comprises primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights, but also 
includes trade-secret rights, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights against 
unfair competition.” Intellectual Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019). 
93 See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 64. 
94 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978). 
95 Id.; See also ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 111 (“In the absence of control over 
our own identities, we are all like puppets that can be used to speak others’ 
words and messages.”). 
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autonomy by giving them control over who their image is sold to, the 
article glosses over the possible emotional and economic harms that 
may result from the commodification of a person’s likeness 
compounded by the complete transferability of publicity rights.96 
Justification for transferability of the right of publicity appears 
primarily when viewed as a purely economic right, which endorses the 
idea that identity or likeness is akin to a commodity that can be sold to 
the highest bidder with control over its future use forfeited. 97 To some, 
the very idea of this is degrading.98 Yet, the right of publicity has 
grown because of this “singular focus on protecting the economic 
value of commodified identity, which can be exploited in a variety of 
ways.”99 Identity as a transferrable commodity cuts against the origins 
of the right—protection against the misuse of one’s identity or 
likeness—and the reason for the right’s existence: the need to protect 
one’s autonomy.100 However, this is not to argue for strict non-
transferability, but rather in favor of limited transferability. The 
limiting of transferability has been used before, specifically with 
property that is impossible to transfer or when allowing its transfer 
would infringe upon fundamental rights.101 
Transferability is not an all or nothing concept.102 “Blood, babies, 
historic buildings, human organs, military service, voting rights, 
endangered species, and alcohol all have limits placed on their 
transferability[,]” ranging from strictly non-transferable to only 
partially limited.103 Most of these commodities can be separated from 
a person in ways that the identity or likeness cannot be.104 Typically, it 
would seem easier to transfer property that is severable from the 
person, which strengthens the argument for limiting transferability of 
 
96 ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 127–28. 
97 See id. at 121 (discussing parents assigning their children’s right of publicity 
resulting in the child’s involuntary forfeiture of that right in the future). 
98 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to 
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 988 (1964) (expounding upon the 
conventional notion that “[n]o man wants to be ‘used’ by another against his 
will”). 
99 McKenna, supra note 9, at 233. 
100 See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 111. 
101 Id. at 125. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. 
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something that is essentially non-severable from the person.105 
Moreover, if one contemplates the serious implications a freely 
transferable right of publicity would have on daily life, the outlook 
becomes bleak. For instance, assume an individual uses an internet 
service in a state that allows the free transfer of publicity rights, or is 
silent on transferability.106 To use the service, the person has to agree 
to certain terms and conditions that enable the internet service to 
obtain an exclusive license to the individual’s publicity rights in their 
images, or likeness, in perpetuity. In essence, this individual has 
signed away their right of publicity. That internet service can now 
potentially impose limits on this person’s ability to market themselves 
in any other way. Or even worse, it can use their likeness in the future, 
without their consent. In this scenario, there are fundamental rights at 
risk that perhaps were never considered by that individual before they 
joined the internet service.107 Through marketing the unsuspecting 
individual’s likeness in accordance with certain groups or services, the 
internet service could infringe upon the individual’s freedom of 
association.108 A court could conceivably find that, in contracting with 
this internet service, the individual voluntarily assigned their publicity 
rights and would have to live with the consequences. Recalling John 
Stuart Mill’s famous quote, Rothman writes that “it is not freedom, to 
be allowed to alienate [one’s] freedom,” but that is what has occurred 
since the creation of the IP-like right of publicity.109 
B. Right of Publicity Today: “A Haystack in a Hurricane”110 
Because the right of publicity was severed from the “personal” tort 
of privacy, “[w]hat may have originated as a concern for the right to be 
left alone has become a tool to control the commercial use and, thus, 
protect the economic value of one’s [identity].”111 The state of disarray 
in publicity cases springs from conflicting state laws barring certain 
 
105 Id. at 127. 
106 Contra id. at 119 (Some states, like Nebraska, explicitly prohibit the 
transferability of the right of publicity, or at least prohibit the forcible 
transference of the right to creditors, like Illinois). 
107 Id. at 128. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 129 (quoting JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 101 (Elizabeth Rapaport 
ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1978) (1859)). 
110 Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956) 
(characterizing the state of publicity rights laws across the United States). 
111 KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
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plaintiffs’ right to publicity actions for a variety of reasons, including 
failure to exploit their identity or commercially profit from it before 
the defendant did.112 States whose laws impose this requirement in 
particular provide for a cause of action exclusive to celebrities, leaving 
non-celebrities without a remedy. Meanwhile, in other states, non-
celebrity plaintiffs are allowed to pursue right of publicity claims.113 
Indeed, courts themselves grapple to find a meaningful distinction 
between the proprietary economic right of publicity (commonly 
pursued by celebrities) and the privacy tort of misappropriation 
(commonly reserved for non-celebrities). It is not difficult to surmise 
that a non-celebrity may suffer economic harm from the exploitation 
of his identity, while a celebrity claiming misappropriation may very 
well experience emotional or reputational harm from the unauthorized 
use of their identity.114 If we persist with this needless dichotomy—
where certain torts are reserved for different classes and statuses—the 
inquiry becomes: to what end? 
Fraley v. Facebook provided a compromise between these two 
ideas in that a non-celebrity could bring a claim for the right of 
 
112 See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting 
that plaintiffs should not have to be required to show they commercially 
exploited their own property to justify economic injury when defendants exploit 
it). 
113 For example, in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the federal court 
held: 
Generally, the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity 
appropriated, the greater will be the extent of the economic injury 
suffered. However, it is quite possible that the appropriation of the 
identity of a celebrity may induce humiliation, embarrassment and 
mental distress, while the appropriation of the identity of a 
relatively unknown person may result in economic injury or may 
itself create economic value in what was previously valueless. 
 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 
 Likewise, in Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, the state supreme court said: 
While a private citizen may not have the same commercial value in 
his or her name and likeness that a celebrity may have, or any 
preexisting commercial value in his or her name and likeness at all 
for that matter, that would not foreclose that person from pursuing 
a cause of action against a wrongdoer who appropriated the 
person’s name and likeness for their own commercial gain. 
 740 S.E.2d 622, 626 (Ga. 2013). 
114 Bullard, 740 S.E.2d at 626. 
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publicity where a defendant’s valuation of the user’s identity 
demonstrated that their identity had value in the first place.115 In 
Fraley, plaintiffs claimed a violation of their right of publicity when 
Facebook, through its Sponsored Stories feature, exploited the 
plaintiffs’ identity to profit from the value of the plaintiffs’ 
“endorsement” in Facebook’s advertising scheme.116 The court 
required a showing of economic injury, and was persuaded by 
plaintiffs’ use of the company’s own statements that Facebook greatly 
valued the plaintiffs’ identities in their advertising.117 Even though the 
plaintiffs’ identities may not have had commercial value prior to their 
engagement with Facebook, by exploiting the plaintiffs’ identities, 
Facebook created the presumption of commercial value, thereby 
enabling the plaintiffs to show economic injury—at least for purposes 
of standing.118 
The motley collection of state right of publicity statutes may never 
be sorted and unified. Nevertheless, there is hope that courts may 
recognize non-celebrities as capable of claiming violations of their 
right of publicity,119 and in so doing, perhaps users’ biometric data 
could find protection as well. 
C. The Right Of Publicity, Unified with the Right of Privacy, 
Could Make Rights Over Personal Identity Stronger and 
Address Biometric Data Concerns 
Shifting the right of publicity from a solely economic property 
right—where identity is merely an assignable commodity, “vendible in 
gross,”120— back to a personal right of privacy, may help strengthen 
autonomy over one’s identity. In this light, identity can continue as a 
bargained-for commodity, but the underlying person, or “identity-
 
115 Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
116 Id. at 799. 
117 Id. at 800. 
118 Id. at 800–01. This presumption has been found in other courts presiding over 
publicity cases. See Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., No. CIV.A.99-4292, 2000 WL 
1801270, at *11 (E.D. Penn. Dec. 7, 2000) (“Inherent in the act of a defendant 
using a person’s name, identity, or persona in a commercially advantageous 
manner is the presumption that the identity has commercial value . . . . I am 
convinced that the right of publicity resides in every person, not just famous and 
infamous individuals.”). 
119 See Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 799. 
120 See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 59. 
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holder,”121 can never be fully divested of ownership. Thus, the 
individual is rendered invulnerable to the intentions of the commercial 
entity, sometimes referred to as the “publicity-holder,” absent options 
to recuperate.122 This would require that some limitations be placed on 
the transferability of identity, as property, recognized either by statute 
or under common law. 
To defend against the misuse of one’s biometric data, the right of 
publicity must be reharmonized with the right of privacy. By shifting 
the right of publicity away from its current status as an assignable 
pseudo-intellectual property right and towards a revitalized dignitary 
right of self-ownership, the social interests advanced by both rights—
dignity, autonomy, and economic efficiency—become unified.123 But, 
as straightforward as this may sound, the obstacles do not end there. 
To effectuate any recognition of biometric data as a protected property 
and privacy right under the right of publicity framework, the meaning 
of identity or likeness under the right of publicity must be reconfigured 
to include biometric data; the commercial value of biometric data in 
today’s economy must be recognized, at least as a precautionary 
measure for courts that require pre-existing commercial value;124 the 
 
121 This is a phrase used by Rothman in her book, The Right of Publicity, to refer to 
the original holder of the identity as opposed to a “publicity-holder,” which 
refers to an entity that has been assigned the identity-holder’s right of publicity, 
perhaps by contracting for exclusive rights to a person’s likeness, for instance. 
Id. at 7. 
122 Id. at 137. 
123 Id. The argument that economic efficiency could be advanced by broader 
publicity protections is that users could be more engaged with sharing and 
networking without fear of biometric identity theft from companies or entities 
purporting a “free” service but really selling users’ data to advertising agencies, 
data brokers, and the like. See Privacy Policy, SNAP INC. (Sept. 14, 2020), 
https://www.snap.com/en-US/privacy/privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/5KWL-
AL46] (“Because most of our services are free, we also use some information 
about you to try and show you ads you’ll find interesting.”). Also, companies 
who are more transparent and give more protections to users could gain a 
competitive advantage in the market where states and foreign countries are 
trending towards greater privacy and data protections. See Gene Marks, 
Biometrics May Answer Your Security Concerns – But Don’t Forget Privacy, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/201
9/apr/04/biometrics-small-business-security-privacy [https://perma.cc/KWR6-
P5QV]. 
124 This seems like it would be challenging to do at this moment in time because of 
the lack of transparency between businesses, data brokers, and consumers as to 
what the precise value of biometric data is. All we know is the value of 
biometric data in the aggregate by looking at how valuable biometric technology 
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actual and potential economic, reputational, or emotional injury 
resulting from continued misappropriation of our identity must be 
appreciated; and finally, limitations must be placed on this reimagined 
right of publicity and its scope narrowly tailored to focus on harms 
against identity-holders.125 It could be that the best method of 
protection over biometric data lies with stronger data privacy laws. 
Nonetheless, in the face of a slow-moving legislature, and the reality 
that some states may never adopt a biometric data privacy statute on 
their own, it is useful to analyze a possible alternative. 
1. What Counts as Identity?: “Name and Likeness” Fails to 
Capture the Modern Ways We Are Identified 
In an action under misappropriation, or the right of publicity,126 
“the question before the courts has been . . . whether there has been 
appropriation of an aspect of the plaintiff’s identity.”127 In order for 
liability to attach, the specific individual’s identity must first be 
discernable from the claim.128 Only then can the courts continue with 
their analysis.129 The right of publicity has expanded over time to 
encompass more than name, photograph, or likeness, for the necessary 
“indicia of identity.”130 Now identity can include fabricated “persona,” 
 
has become. See Biometric System Market - Global Forecast to 2024 supra, note 
14. 
125 Doing so would limit who could bring suit for a violation of a right of publicity, 
thus narrowing the pool of potential litigants. 
126 All references to the right of publicity will also refer to actions under the privacy 
tort of misappropriation as many courts use the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., 
Somerson v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (N.D. 
Ga. 2013) (quoting Thoroughbred Legends, LLC v. Walt Disney Co., No. 1:07–
CV–1275–BBM, 2008 WL 616253, at *11 n.13 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2008) 
(“[t]here is no substantive difference between the interests protected by the 
common law ‘right of publicity’ and the interests protected by the appropriation 
prong of the invasion of privacy tort.”)); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“The common law right of 
publicity derives from the fourth category of invasion of privacy identified by 
Dean Prosser, described as ‘appropriation’ of a plaintiff’s name or likeness for 
the defendant’s advantage.”); see also Posner, supra note 94, at 411(finding the 
privacy tort of appropriation and right of publicity basically identical). 
127 Prosser, supra note 90, at 403. 
128 Id. at 404–05. 
129 Id. at 405. 
130 See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 97. 
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or even a substantial reference to a particular individual that would 
allow identification.131 
It takes no great stretch of the imagination to connect a person’s 
likeness or identity with one’s biometric data; arguably, they are one in 
the same. A person’s “likeness” is often comprised of unique physical 
or behavioral attributes such that a reasonable person would be able to 
see and identify the specified individual. Biometric data, as described 
supra in Section II(A), is a reference to the unique physical and 
behavioral traits that reliably and accurately identify human beings.132 
Some states, like Indiana for example, employ statutory language, 
which implies that certain biometric identifiers already qualify for 
protection under their statutes.133 The relevant portion of Indiana’s 
statutory right of publicity lists that “voice; 
[]signature; . . . []distinctive appearance; . . . or []mannerisms” would 
all qualify as protected under the statute.134 These attributes are also 
considered biometric identifiers because, in addition to fingerprints 
and facial recognition mapping, a person’s signature and their 
distinctive bodily movements, such as keystrokes or gait, are 
measurable, identifiable, behavioral attributes.135 Additionally, in New 
York, there is a statute providing for both a civil and a criminal cause 
of action regarding a person’s right of publicity.136 The civil statute 
prevents the unauthorized use of a person’s voice, a specified 
biometric identifier. 137 However, in the event a state statute fails to list 
a specific biometric identifier, the inclusion of the word “likeness” 
should arguably encompass biometric data, as it is essentially 
comprised of a person’s likeness. Where possible, a change should be 
made to the state’s publicity statutes to include “biometric indicator,” 
which would arguably satisfy the full definition of likeness. 
 
131 Id. at 89. 
132 See Biometrics Review, supra note 8. 
133 IND. CODE § 32-36-1-7 (2020). 
134 Id. Contra 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (2020) (prohibiting only the unauthorized 
use of name, picture, or portrait; specifically, § 9-1-28.1(a)(2) provides a “right 
to be secure from an appropriation of one’s name or likeness”). 
135 See Biometrics Review, supra note 8. 
136 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2020). 
137 Id. § 51. 
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2. Biometric Data Has Commercial Value, but No One is 
Willing to Share 
There are no hard and fast numbers assigning a specific dollar 
value to a person’s biometric data.138 While it can be discerned that 
biometric data has value based on the skyrocketing market value of the 
technology needed to facilitate its use, exact numbers remain elusive. 
“[T]he shadowy world of data brokers,”139 “[who] are notoriously 
secretive” provides little insight into how much they charge for sharing 
sensitive information, or even how many data brokers exist and do 
business.140 “Getting answers from the data brokers themselves, as 
Congress found, is next to impossible[.]”141 Legislatures agree that 
biometric data is being collected and marketed, and acknowledge the 
risk of the exploitation of this valuable asset in the statement of intent 
portions of their biometric data privacy statutes.142 For example, 
Washington and Illinois include legislative intent passages that speak 
to the presumption of a risk of harm, or even a particularized harm, to 
citizens whose biometric data was vulnerable to collection and 
misuse.143 By acknowledging this risk, the legislatures are implying 
that biometric data has an innate value, or worth, to the owner. If more 
courts, like the Fraley court, recognized the inherent commercial value 
of biometric data, then demonstrating economic harm would not be 
such an arduous task. In acknowledging this inherent value, users 
would be able to substantiate the claim that biometric data has pre-
existing commercial value and is therefore capable of exploitation. 
 
138 At least, not that this author could find while scouring the web. 
139 See Yael Grauer, What Are ‘Data Brokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping up 
Information About You?, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjpx3w/what-are-data-brokers-and-how-to-
stop-my-private-data-collection [https://perma.cc/YJ7P-LBK2]. 
140 Paul Boutin, The Secretive World of Selling Data About You, NEWSWEEK: TECH. 
& SCI. (May 30, 2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-
selling-data-about-you-464789 [https://perma.cc/5D6C-YH8N]. 
141 Id. 
142 See BI, WASH. REV. CODE. § 19.375.900 (2020) (“[C]ollection and marketing of 
biometric information about individuals, without consent or knowledge of the 
individual whose data is collected, is of increasing concern.” (emphasis added)); 
see also Take Control of Your Virtual Identity #GDPR, EUR. COMMISSION (June 
2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/virtual_identity_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4TC-6TJK] (“[Companies] map your virtual 
identity . . . . [T]hen monetise your virtual identity for targeted advertising.”). 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 60 & 78. 
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Although the proposition of value premised on the magnitude of the 
market can be made, it is unclear whether this large aggregate number 
would be persuasive enough to establish proof of pre-existing 
commercial value. 
Weighing biometric data’s benefits to the economy and security 
against the potential harm to autonomy still favors limitations on the 
commodification of likeness or identity. It is useful to remember that a 
partial limitation on the assignability and transferability of one’s 
publicity rights, including biometric identifiers, may not have the 
impact necessary to chill the market. First Amendment defenses to the 
rights of privacy and publicity are avenues that would protect the use 
of biometric data in cases of newsworthiness or expressionist works, 
which are also very important to our society. Absent tighter 
regulations, these First Amendment defenses operate as some of the 
only protections given the current disarray of state publicity laws. 
Considering the effort and transactional costs involved in litigating 
these issues, limiting the transferability of publicity rights remains a 
heavy task. 144 
It is important to reflect on the societal concerns with the loss, or 
substantial decrease, of autonomy over biometric data and the ultimate 
goal to have awareness and control over when and how our identities 
are used. It is true that to function comfortably in today’s society, 
individuals must engage with the internet and social media. However, 
it does not follow that in exchange for providing users with a “free” 
service, companies should then be able to collect users’ unique and 
valuable biometric data, and share it with unknown or undocumented 
third party associates.145 Without facing any regulations or compulsion 
to disclose, there is no impetus to reveal which third-parties these 
companies are selling information to and for what specific purpose.146 
In this fashion, lack of knowledge is lack of autonomy because without 
knowledge, a person has no power or control over how their biometric 
information is shared or used. Every individual has a right of 
publicity,147 whether the sale or usage of their biometric data was 
 
144 See Jennifer Rothman, Rothman’s Roadmap to the Right of Publicity, RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY ROADMAP.COM, https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/ [https://p
erma.cc/G4MP-ZZZW] (illustrating how varied state-to-state right of publicity 
and common law misappropriation laws are). 
145 See Privacy Policy, supra note 28. 
146 This is currently the case with the data brokerage market. See Grauer, supra note 
139. 
147 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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conducted openly or clandestinely. While it may seem extreme to 
completely disallow the assignability of biometric data in return for 
use of a service, ultimate control should remain with the “identity-
holder.”148 If the dissemination of biometric data cannot be regulated 
on the front end, then users should at least be provided with an exit 
strategy. 
One solution, as previously mentioned, may be in acknowledging a 
right of publicity action where the user could enjoin the use of their 
biometric data, or at minimum, claim damages for its misuse. Another 
potential strategy also briefly discussed previously, is a regulatory 
solution. This regulatory solution is an exit strategy that would include 
the ultimate right to regain control over one’s own data at a time of 
their choosing, or at a minimum, the guaranteed and periodic 
destruction/anonymization of biometric data, commonly referred to as 
the “right to be forgotten.”149 A comprehensive solution, whether 
judge-made or regulatory, should begin with an examination of the 
regulatory solutions currently in effect, specifically those in the 
European Union and California. 
V. EIGHT LETTERS MAKE A BIG IMPACT: GDPR AND CCPA’S 
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PRIVACY RIGHTS 
The European Union’s GDPR and California’s CCPA are at the 
forefront of the global trend to slow the rampant dissemination of 
individuals’ biometric and personal data in order to reinforce privacy 
rights and address security concerns.150 While the two regulations are 
similar, there are differences and takeaways that can be analyzed to 
assess how these regulations address concerns for autonomy over 
biometric data and whether they are better suited to address those 
concerns over a reimagined right of publicity. 
 
148 ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 7. 
149 See Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), supra 
note 42. 
150 See Dimitri Sirota, California’s New Data Privacy Law Brings U.S. Closer to 
GDPR, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/1
1/14/californias-new-data-privacy-law-brings-u-s-closer-to-gdpr/ 
[https://perma.cc/9XUA-HNMK]. 
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A. The GDPR: EU General Data Protection Regulation is Two 
Years Old and Europe is Still Standing 
The EU General Data Protection Regulation went into effect in 
May of 2018.151 This regulation immediately created “one set of rules 
directly applicable in all the European Member States regarding the 
protection of personal data.”152 The GDPR protects EU residents’ 
data—including biometric data—by compelling companies to: (1) 
provide users with an opt-in option first before “processing”153 any 
data; (2) disclose information about the processing of the user’s data in 
“clear and plain language”;154 (3) provide users with the right to object 
to any “take-it-or-leave-it” services;155 (4) give users access to all of 
their data, and ensure the transferability to the user in portable 
electronic format;156 (5) inform the user if their data has been hacked 
or “leaked”;157 and (6) grant users’ requests that all their personal data 
be deleted, otherwise known as “[t]he right to be forgotten.”158 In 
addition to EU Member States, any “[n]on-EU established 
organizations will be subject to the GDPR if they process personal 
data about EU data subjects. This makes the GDPR a global law.”159 In 
some cases, the GDPR has appointed Data Protection Officers as an 
enforcement measure to verify that companies are in compliance with 
the GDPR.160 Were a company to process an EU resident’s data 
 
151 See Take Control of Your Virtual Identity #GDPR, supra note 142. 
152 See Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), supra 
note 42. 
153 “The term ‘processing’ is very broad. It essentially means anything that is done 
to, or with, personal data (including simply collecting, storing or deleting those 
data).” Dr. Detlev Gabel & Tim Hickman, Chapter 5: Key definitions – 








158 Id. The “right to be forgotten” means that EU residents can request a company 
delete all of their personal data unless a legitimate reason is presented for its 
preservation. Id. 
159 See Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), supra 
note 42. 
160 Id. (especially companies having over 250 employees). 
226 UMass Law Review v. 16 | 198 
without complying with the GDPR or without the user’s explicit 
consent, the company would face serious penalties.161 
Unlike the varied methods of relief afforded in state statutes across 
the U.S., the GDPR allows all EU residents a private right to lodge a 
formal complaint for “material or non-material damage caused by a 
data controller or data processors breach of the GDPR.”162 Civil 
penalties under the GDPR include a potential fine of €20 million, or 
4% of the company’s annual profit.163 A German “social networking 
operator was fined €20,000 for failing to secure users’ data.”164 Google 
is also facing a $57 million fine for non-compliance with the GDPR’s 
transparency and opt-in guarantee.165 Additionally, a data brokering 
company was fined €220,000 for “failing to inform citizens that their 
data was being processed by the company.”166 The GDPR has been 
operating for only two years, but by instituting some serious penalties, 
it has already shown that it means business. It is hard to tell at such an 
early stage if we can expect the same from California’s newest act. 
 
161 Id. This is not without some exceptions. For example, the “biometric 
information is necessary for carrying out obligations of the controller or the data 
subject in the field of employment, social security and social protection law”; 
“to protect the vital interests of the individual and he/she is incapable of giving 
consent”; “it’s critical for any legal claims”; there is a public health reason 
affecting public interest. Id. Moreover, Member States must conform to these 
regulations, but they are allowed “to introduce other limitations regarding the 
processing of biometric information.” Id. 
162 Laura Jehl & Alan Friel, CCPA and GDPR Comparison Chart, BAKER & 
HOSTETLER LLP 6 (2018), https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Privacy/2018/Ar
ticles/CCPA-GDPR-Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF6M-5637]. 
163 Id. at 7. 
164 GDPR in Numbers, EUROPA, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/infographic-gdpr_in_numbers_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/36VF-
SGMG]. CNIL, a French data protection watchdog concluded in its report that 
there is an “alleged lack of transparency. ‘Essential information, such as the data 
processing purposes, the data storage periods or the categories of personal data 
used for the ads personalization, are excessively disseminated across several 
documents, with buttons and links on which it is required to click to access 
complementary information[.]’” Dillet, supra note 22. 
165 See Dillet, supra note 22. Google’s fine is the largest fine under the GDPR to 
date. Adam Satariano, Google Is Fined $57 Million Under Europe’s Data 
Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/
technology/google-europe-gdpr-fine.html [https://perma.cc/QR92-XR95]. 
166 GDPR in Numbers, supra note 164. 
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B. California’s 2020 Rollout of the CCPA 
“On June 28, 2018, California became the first U.S. state with a 
comprehensive consumer privacy law when it enacted the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA).”167 This regulation went into 
effect January 1, 2020 and aims to protect consumers residing or 
domiciled in California. 168 In some ways, the CCPA is similar to the 
GDPR in that the main goal of the CCPA is to protect the processing 
of personal information capable of identifying a human being.169 One 
of the most important provisions from the GDPR, “the right to be 
forgotten,” has also made its way to the CCPA, where “a consumer has 
the right to deletion of personal information a business has 
collected.”170 There is also an important exception to both the CCPA 
and the GDPR protection schemes: data that has been de-identified, or 
otherwise made anonymous.171 Indeed, if the information can no 
longer be connected, or successfully used, to identify an individual, 
users would have no need to control that data because their identity or 
likeness would not be at stake. 
 
167 Jehl & Friel, supra note 162, at 1. 
168 Id. Defined as: “California residents that are either: In California for other than a 
temporary or transitory purpose. Domiciled in California but are currently 
outside the State for a temporary or transitory purpose. Consumers include: 
Customers of household goods and services. Employees. Business-to-Business 
transactions.” Id. at 2. 
169 Id. The CCPA excludes from “personal information” matters of public record 
and other information under the protection of different legislation outside the 
regulation’s scope. Id. 
170 Id. at 5. Unlike the GDPR, which sets forth six circumstances under which a 
user may request deletion of their data, the CCPA has no prerequisites to users’ 
data deletion but such requests are subject to exceptions. Id. The regulation does 
allow businesses to have some discretion over whether they honor a request, 
although revocation of consent should be enough. Id. 
171 See Ribarić & Pavešić, supra note 4, at 296. 
     The terms de-identification and anonymization are often used 
interchangeably, but there is difference between them. De-
identification refers to the reversible (two- directional) process of 
removing or obscuring any personally identifiable information 
from individual records in a way that minimizes the risk of 
unintended disclosure of the identity of individuals and 
information about them. 
     Anonymization refers to an irreversible (uni-directional) 
process of de-identification that does not allow the original 
personal identifiers to be obtained from de-identified ones. 
 Id. 
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While the GDPR focuses on data processors in the general sense, 
meaning that any person or entity can process a resident’s individual 
data, the CCPA targets large-scale businesses that utilize data brokers 
to engage primarily in the buying and selling of data.172 The Act only 
regulates commercial companies that do business in California, or 
companies that are under the control, or share common branding with, 
a Californian entity. To fall within the scope of the regulation, it must 
be shown that the entity also satisfies one of the following 
requirements: “Has a gross revenue greater than $25 million. Annually 
buys, receives, sells, or shares the personal information of more than 
50,000 consumers, households, or devices for commercial purposes. 
[Or] [d]erives 50 percent or more of annual revenues from selling 
consumers’ personal information.”173 Where the GDPR regulates all 
the data controllers and processors established in or providing services 
or goods within the EU, it is clear the CCPA is much narrower in 
scope. The regulation of the data broker industry, in California alone, 
could be immensely helpful in determining how that industry works 
and adequately assessing the risk levels associated with the 
dissemination of sensitive data. 
Another key difference between the two approaches is the ability 
to opt out. The GDPR provides users with an opt-out ability, where 
data subjects can withdraw consent and “opt-out of processing data for 
marketing purposes” at any time. but the option is not as strict as the 
CCPA’s. The California law requires action on the part of companies 
to “enable and comply with a consumer’s request to opt-out of the sale 
of personal information to third parties[.]”174 Additionally, the CCPA 
requires that businesses “include a ‘Do Not Sell My Personal 
Information’ link in a clear and conspicuous location on a website 
homepage.”175 
One of the biggest differences between the GDPR and the CCPA is 
who may file an action against businesses that allegedly violate the 
regulations. Under the CCPA, private individuals generally cannot sue 
businesses, but there is an avenue “if there is a data breach, and even 
then, only under limited circumstances.”176 Otherwise, it falls to the 
 
172 Jehl & Friel, supra note 162, at 1–2. 
173 Id. at 1. 
174 Id. at 4. 
175 Id. 
176 California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CA.GOV, 
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa [https://perma.cc/23TM-LEQX] (select the 
seventh option entitled “What can I do if I think a business violated the CCPA?” 
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California Attorney General to bring an action against businesses.177 
Under the GDPR, all EU residents, or “data subjects,” have a right to 
compensation from a data processor or controller that violated the 
Regulation;178 the subject may institute an action for that 
compensation in any competent Member State court where he or she 
resides or where the company has an establishment.179 
C. The Reimagined Right of Publicity & The CCPA 
On its face, California’s Consumer Privacy Act seems to mitigate 
some of the concerns surrounding autonomy and biometric data 
because it allows users to regain ownership and control of their data. 
Because this regulation is in the heart of one of the largest economies 
in the world—Silicon Valley in California—there is risk of a chilling 
effect on tech companies seeking to innovate through the use of 
biometrics.180 Furthermore, because the CCPA only affects large-scale 
companies, data brokers, and entities doing business in California, the 
effect it will have on the United States is largely unknown. However, 
with many tech giants based in California,181 it is possible the effects 
of the CCPA will be felt nationwide as companies overhaul their 
privacy policies to account for the increased protections of biometric 
data. 
It is also possible that the CCPA could support the resurgence, or a 
reimagined version, of the right of publicity. Instead of eclipsing the 
 
under the heading “A. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE CCPA”). 
Private individuals 
can sue a business if [their] nonencrypted and nonredacted 
personal information was stolen in a data breach as a result of the 
business’s failure to maintain reasonable security procedures and 
practices to protect it. If this happens, [they] can sue for the 
amount of monetary damages [they] actually suffered from the 
breach or ‘statutory damages’ up to $750 per incident. 
 Id. 
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178 2016 O.J. (L 119) 679 at art. 82. 
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180 See Samantha Ann Schwartz, CCPA Critics Warn Innovation Could Lose Under 
the Law. What’s at Stake?, CIODIVE (July 14, 2020), https://www.ciodive.com/
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right of publicity, the CCPA could work in conjunction with the right 
of publicity, by providing evidence of the commercial value of a non-
celebrity’s biometric data. Working in concert, the CCPA would 
operate as a preventative measure by deterring companies from 
usurping user identities, while the right of publicity would operate as 
the endgame by enjoining companies’ continued use or control over 
users’ identities. The CCPA’s effect on data brokers, with its focus on 
transparency and compliance with data privacy and publicity rights, 
will shed light on which companies sell biometric data, to whom, and 
for what purpose.182 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under the spreading chestnut tree 
I sold you and you sold me: 
There lie they, and here lie we 
Under the spreading chestnut tree.183 
Given the newness of the CCPA, which went into effect in January 
2020, it may be pragmatic to wait and observe any windfall, or fallout, 
from this comprehensive privacy statute before deeming it—or the 
GDPR—the best possible solution toward granting users increased 
autonomy over their biometric data. Perhaps the CCPA will serve as a 
model for a nationwide biometric data privacy law and perhaps it will 
not. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see California “serve as a 
“laboratory” to address this complex socio-economic issue, “without 
risk to the rest of the country.”184 It seems that the CCPA, as well as 
the GDPR, will carry out the intent driving the right of publicity: 
protect individuals’ rights over their person against another’s 
exploitation to their own benefit. This is not an easy path. If these 
regulatory efforts do not effectuate a complete solution, a reimagined 
right of publicity may be the best option to defend against the 
misappropriation of a newly commodified identity. 
 
182 See Timothy Tobin et al., The Challenge Ahead – The Impact of the CCPA on 
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